On more analysis of the credit market saga...

As we move further down the path of the subprime, then credit market mess, people are able to draw more hindsight conclusion on what went right, but in large part, on what went wrong, and who are to blame for these messes. The latest 20/20 hindsight was from Bloomberg, which serves to remind us how those once-great men/brains (like Greenspan and Rubin) turned out to be dead wrong about pushing for less regulation of the derivatives, and how industry lobbyists that serve no one but the interested parties like banks pushed the envelope further in order to allow banks to take on more and more risks, basically with no oversight.

It's worth noting that some $680 billions were written down, another $700 billions in bailout from Washington, and endless loans and guarantees from US Treasury and EU countries in the attempt to prop up the markets across the globe. One notable success which stands out like a green island in this sea of chaos, is the mortgage market in China. Though Washington and bankers from the West can do all they want, to talk down the Chinese government's attempt in strictly regulating its market and currency, and on how unsophisticated the Chinese banking industry and credit market might be, the Chinese did do some things right. Obviously, some of the Chinese's practices won't sell in the West (eg. mandating all mortgages to end when mortgagees reach retirement age), but they work just as intended, in the local markets.

Perhaps other developing countries like India should draw the lessons learnt from China; in particular, that the Western (and IMF) approach does not always work, and that they should draw up their own action plans to suit their own local needs.